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A common argument for atheism runs as follows: God would not create a world worse than other worlds he
could have created instead. However, if God exists, he could have created a better world than this one. There-
fore, God does not exist. In this paper I challenge the second premise of this argument. I argue that if God
exists, our world will continue without end, with God continuing to create value-bearers, and sustaining and
perfecting the value-bearers he has already created. Given this, if God exists, our world—considered on the
whole—is inﬁnitely valuable. I further contend that this theistic picture makes our world’s value unsurpass-
able. In support of this contention, I consider proposals for how inﬁnitely valuable worlds might be improved
upon, focusing on two main ways—adding value-bearers and increasing the value in present value-bearers. I
argue that neither of these can improve our world. Depending on how each method is understood, either it
would not improve our world, or our world is unsurpassable with respect to it. I conclude by considering the
implications of my argument for the problem of evil more generally conceived.
One atheistic argument from evil proceeds as follows:
(1) If God exists, he would only create a world if there is no better world that he
could have created instead.
(2) If God exists, he could have created a better world than this one.
Since, if God exists, he created this world, the consequents of (1) and (2) cannot both be
true. It follows that their antecedent is false, and that
(3) God does not exist.
Call this argument the Argument from Surpassability, or AFS for short.2 Leibniz (1710)
famously denied (2) of this argument, claiming that ours is the unique best of all possible
1 This paper was written with the support of a generous grant from the Templeton Foundation on Contemporary
Moral Theory and the Problem of Evil (grant number 43655). I am grateful to Jim Sterba, the leader of that
project, and my fellow research assistant Meg Schmitt for their helpful discussion and comments on early
drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank participants in the Center for Philosophy of Religion Discussion
Group at Notre Dame for their feedback on a draft of this paper, and Dustin Crummett in particular for his
extensive written comments and extremely helpful discussion of the issues explored in this paper.
2 The AFS is expressed in basically this form by Perkins (1983), Sobel (2004: 468), Wielenberg (2004:
57), Hudson (2013: 236), and Kraay (2013: 399). Some presentations of the argument replace (1) above
with the claim that God must create the best possible world. However, this presupposes that there is a
single best possible world. (1) leaves open the possibility that there are multiple equally good or incom-
parable worlds such that no world is better than any of these worlds. Another variation on this argument
replaces (2) with the stronger claim that for any possible world, there is a better one creatable by God.
Since the second premise of this argument is logically stronger than (2), my argument against (2) in this
paper also challenges this argument.
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worlds. Contemporary theistic philosophers have generally been reticent to follow him in
this. Robert Adams (1972) denies (1) by arguing that by failing to create a better world
than he did God would not necessarily be violating anyone’s rights or manifesting a
defect in character, and could in fact be manifesting grace.3 Other theistic philosophers
have objected to (1) with the following argument: there is no best possible world; for ev-
ery world that God can create, there is a better one that he could have created instead.4
Thus, it is unreasonable to blame God for not creating a better world, because it is logi-
cally impossible for him to both create a world and satisfy the consequent of (1). Skep-
tics of this move have responded that if (1) is false, this implies that a perfect being (like
God) is impossible—for a perfect being would never perform a surpassable action, and
yet the fact that there is no best possible world makes it impossible for a creator to avoid
performing a surpassable action.5
In this paper I follow Leibniz in arguing against (2). Unlike Leibniz, however, I do
not think that our world is the uniquely best world. Instead, I argue for the weaker con-
clusion that there are not other worlds better than ours. It is compatible with this conclu-
sion that the goodness of some other worlds is equal to or incomparable with that of
ours.
My argument proceeds in two stages. First, I argue that given theological assumptions
that the proponent of the AFS ought to accept, if God created the world, then there is an
inﬁnite amount of value in our world. Second, I argue that, given these assumptions, not
only is our world inﬁnitely valuable, it is unsurpassable: on any plausible principles that
allow us to rank different inﬁnitely valuable worlds, there are no other inﬁnitely valuable
worlds better than this world.
I should stress at the outset that I do not think that my argument solves the “prob-
lem of evil” more generally. There remain serious philosophical objections to theism
based on the existence of the evil we ﬁnd in our world even if my argument works.
However, I think that my argument does show that the AFS is not the best way to
formulate the problem of evil. While God’s existence may be incompatible with or
disconﬁrmed by the evils in the world, this is not because those evils make the world
as a whole worse than it may have otherwise been. I explore the relation between
my argument and the problem of evil more generally in the ﬁnal section of this
paper.
3 For criticisms of Adams, see Quinn (1992), Grover (2003), Wielenberg (2004), and Rowe (2004: 74–87).
4 See, e.g., Plantinga (1976: 61), Schlesinger (1977: ch. 9–10), Forrest (1981), Reichenbach (1982: 122–
28), Morris (1993), and Swinburne (1994: 134–36) and (2004: 113–15).
5 See Quinn (1992), Perkins (1983: 247), Grover (1988, 2004), Wielenberg (2004: 56–59), Rowe (2004: 88–
142), and Kraay (2010). Leibniz explicitly rejected the possibility of an inﬁnitely improving series of worlds,
on the grounds that this would make God’s choice to create violate the Principle of Sufﬁcient Reason (see
Blumenfeld [1975] for discussion). Contemporary defenders of the claim that a God with no best world to
create could not be perfect frequently appeal to the possibility of morally or rationally superior “rival cre-
ators.” This basic idea was suggested in Kant’s Lectures on Philosophical Theology (1978: 137):
That the world created by God is the best of all possible worlds, is clear for the following reason. If
a better world than the one willed by God were possible, then a will better than the divine will
would also have to be possible. For indisputably that will is better which chooses what is better. But
if a better will is possible, then so is a being who could express this better will. And therefore this




In this essay I understand God to be the omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good cre-
ator of all contingent things. I understand the world to include all of space and time and
anything that exists outside of space and time. In other words, ‘the world’ refers to all of
reality (including God). Importantly, on this deﬁnition of ‘world,’ there can be only one
actual world. Now, (for all I know) God could create multiple spatiotemporally closed
systems; in this case I will say that God creates several universes. So there can be only
one world, but many universes. Strictly speaking God creates universes (and the things
in them), not worlds, since a world includes God. However, I will sometimes speak
loosely of God creating worlds; the reader should understand this to mean God’s creating
the contingent things in a world, including the universe(s) it contains.
I assume, for simplicity’s sake, that God has knowledge of all future events, including
(if such there be) indeterministic events or libertarian free actions, and I will ignore pos-
sible constraints on what possible worlds God can create arising from indeterministic
events or libertarian free actions. I will also speak as if God acts in time; later, I will con-
sider how to reformulate relevant parts of my argument without this assumption.
I further assume that it is possible to rank worlds according to their goodness or
value.6 (In this paper, I use ‘value’ and ‘goodness’ interchangeably.) Although I proceed
as if world-values are measurable by some precise number, my arguments could be refor-
mulated with ranges or sets of numbers representing the values of worlds. (In section V I
consider whether the AFS can be defended if it turns out that world-values are not mea-
surable at all.)
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section II I present the three
most common arguments for (2) in the literature. (Often these are presented as arguments
for the stronger claim that there is no best world.) Defenders of these arguments, I sug-
gest, ought to accept some theological assumptions about how God acts if he exists. But
these assumptions imply that if God exists, the world is inﬁnitely valuable.
The defender of (2) might maintain that even if our world is inﬁnitely valuable, it is
still improvable. Contra this, in sections III and IV I consider some general principles
that philosophers have proposed for how to rank inﬁnitely valuable worlds, and argue
that the above three arguments for (2) fail if formulated by means of such principles. In
section V I further argue against a “particularist” defense of (2) that denies the need to
appeal to general principles for dealing with inﬁnite value. Finally, in section VI, I con-
sider the implications of my argument for atheistic arguments from evil more generally.
II. Arguments that the World Could be Improved
One common argument for (2) focuses on the number of value-bearers in the world, usu-
ally persons. For example, imagine our world (henceforwardly, ‘@’), but with one more
6 Thomson (2008: 19) denies that talk of the goodness of worlds makes sense, on the grounds that “possi-
ble world” is not a goodness-ﬁxing kind. I am sympathetic to her criticisms, but I suspect that even if
she is right there is some similar concept that can do the same work in the argument. For example, we
could talk instead about the desires that God necessarily has (given his perfect nature), suppose that there
is some way of balancing these off (some divine decision theory), and claim that, other things equal
(e.g., absent deontological side-constraints) a perfect being will maximize desire satisfaction. Then to
respond to the AFS I would need to show that God’s desires would not be better satisﬁed in some other
world than in this one.
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happy person. This other world (so the argument goes) is better than @. More generally,
imagine some world W. Now imagine W*, which is qualitatively identical to W except
that it contains one more happy person. W* is better than W. But for any world W, we
can imagine a W* with one more happy person. So for any possible world, there is a bet-
ter world.7
A related argument for (2) focuses on the variety of goods in @. A distinguished tra-
dition in Christian theology views the goodness of the world as depending not (just) on
the number of creatures in the world, but also on the variety and diversity of the kinds of
creatures in the world. This is sometimes called the principle of plenitude. In the Summa
(Ia.47.1), Aquinas writes that:
[God] brought things into existence in order to communicate His goodness to creatures
and to represent His goodness through them. And since His goodness cannot be ade-
quately represented by any one creature, He produced many diverse creatures, so that
what was lacking in one’s representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by
another. For the goodness that exists in a simple and uniform way in God exists in a mul-
tiple and divided way among creatures. Hence, the universe as a whole participates in
and represents God’s goodness in a more perfect way than any other creature does.8
But consider again W and W*, and this time make W* qualitatively identical to W
except that it contains one more species or kind of creature in it. It seems that W* exhi-
bits more variety than W, and so is (by the above reasoning) better than it. But this is
true for any W and W*, and so for any world there is a better.9
A third argument for (2) concerns the quality of creaturely experiences. Instead of sug-
gesting that God could create more creatures, this argument notes that he could have
made the experiences of actual creatures different. Here is how Perkins (1983: 242) puts
the argument:
Imagine a world W* which, if actualized, would be just like the actual world @ in all
respects except that W* would contain an event (E’k) which is slightly less painful than
its corresponding event (Ek) in @. Let us suppose that Ek is the momentary twinge of
toothache of my neighbor’s Irish terrier. What we are saying, then, is that the worlds @
and W* would be just alike except that in W* the dog’s toothache would be slightly less
painful than it is in @.10
If we understand ‘suffering’ broadly enough to include examples such as Perkins’s, then
we can take this argument to suggest that God could have bettered our world by making
creatures suffer less. As this formulation suggests, this argument is the most similar to
better-known arguments from evil, such as Rowe’s (1996) argument that the existence of
God is incompatible with the existence of gratuitous (unnecessary) suffering. I discuss
these similarities more in the ﬁnal section of this paper.
We have seen three propositions which defenders of (2) cite in its support:
7 Variations on this argument are given in Plantinga (1976: 61), Reichenbach (1982: 125), Morris
(1993: 237), Swinburne (1994: 134–36, 2004: 114–15), Rowe (2004), and Monton (2010: 124–27).
8 Augustine expresses similar ideas in his City of God, Book XI.
9 This argument is made in Reichenbach (1982: 127) and Rowe (2004: 51–52).
10 I have silently altered Perkins’s notations to match my own, and corrected a typo (‘even (Ek)’ instead of
‘event (Ek)’).
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(4) If God exists, he could have made a better world than this one by creating more
creatures.
(5) If God exists, he could have made a better world than this one by creating more
species.
(6) If God exists, he could have made a better world than this one by lessening the
suffering of creatures.
In evaluating the goodness of the world, we ought to consider the entire world, including
both past and future.11 When we do this, we have to consider whether or not there is an
end to the world at which we can look back and evaluate it on the whole, or whether the
world continues going on (and changing) forever. Defenders of (2) often tacitly assume
that the world is spatially and temporally ﬁnite. However, I will now argue that anyone
sympathetic to (4)–(6) should hold that, if God exists, this is not so.
Leibniz (1710: s. 195–96) similarly emphasized the inﬁnitude of the world in denying
(2):
Someone will say that it is impossible to produce the best, because there is no perfect
creature, and that it is always possible to produce one which would be more perfect. I
answer that what can be said of a creature or of a particular substance, which can always
be surpassed by another, is not to be applied to the universe, which, since it must extend
through all future eternity, is an inﬁnity. . . . [T]he adversary will be obliged to maintain
that one possible universe may be better than the other, to inﬁnity; but there he would be
mistaken, and it is that which he cannot prove.
I follow Leibniz in thinking that the world “extend[s] through all future eternity.” How-
ever, most contemporary cosmological theories imply that either our particular universe
will come to an end or there will come a time at which no more living things can exist
in it. Supposing that, as in many traditional forms of theism, the people in the universe
all continue to exist in some afterlife after death, will God then simply focus all his atten-
tion on the afterlife existence of those people he has already created, or will he create
more people (either by altering the conditions of our universe to allow for life, or, more
plausibly, by creating a new universe)?
It is plausible that he will create more people. We could motivate this by saying, in
line with (4) above, that the world would be better if it contained more people (assuming
their lives ultimately go well, at least), and that God would want the world to be better.
More generally, whatever considerations led God to create creatures in the ﬁrst place,
those same considerations would plausibly lead him to continue to create. For example,
suppose that God has a desire for communion with other persons. There is no reason to
think that he would not desire communion with still more persons once he has created
10 billion, or 100 billion, given that there are no limitations on how many persons God
11 Hick (2010: 81; cf. 166) objects to Leibniz’s claim that this is the best of all possible worlds on the
grounds that “if this world, with its evils, is the best that is possible, there is no scope or hope for
improvement.” But this wrongly assumes that if the world is unimprovable as a whole then it is unim-
provable at a time.
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can be in a relationship with. Or suppose that God’s creating ﬁnite persons is an expres-
sion of his love and creativity. Creating more ﬁnite persons does not cease to be an
expression of his love and creativity after he has created 10 billion, or 100 billion, and
so it seems that God would continue to express his love and creativity by continuing to
create.12
In what follows I will assume that if God exists, he will continue to create more peo-
ple as above. I will further assume that people will continue to exist eternally in an after-
life.13 Finally, I will assume that, if God exists, universalism is true—in particular, that
for any person, there is some time at which that person becomes morally perfect and
enjoys full communion with God. These last two assumptions ought to be amenable to
anyone who thinks that God could improve the world by lessening the suffering of crea-
tures or by providing them with positive experiences.14
I think that these theological assumptions are both plausible and compatible with
orthodox Christianity. But for those theists inclined to view them with suspicion, let me
reiterate that their role in my argument is primarily dialectical: that is to say, they are
motivated by arguments philosophers tend to give for the second premise of the AFS.
Theists who reject these theological assumptions are thus likely to reject these arguments,
and so reject the AFS on independent grounds. Readers so inclined can view my argu-
ment in this paper as showing that even if one grants the atheist the problematic claims
made in defenses of the AFS, the argument still fails to show that God does not exist.
If we do accept the above assumptions, the sum total of value in the world is appar-
ently inﬁnite. Each individual person enjoys everlasting communion with God, the high-
est good possible, and so each individual’s life is inﬁnitely good on the whole. Since
there are, over the whole of time, an inﬁnite number of persons, there are then an inﬁnite
number of inﬁnitely valuable lives in the world.
We should not just suppose that the value of the world is equal to the total value of peo-
ple’s lives. This would amount to assuming that the value of a world is equal to the sum of
the values of the value-bearing parts of a world (in a slogan: the value of a world is the
value in a world), and that people are the only value-bearing parts of a world. Neither of
these assumptions is obvious. However, it is independently plausible that if the world is as
I have supposed here, the value of the world is inﬁnite. For example, suppose that the value
12 This idea is thoroughly Leibnizian. Kretzmann (2001: 224) endorses a similar Neoplatonist principle that
“Goodness is by its very nature diffusive of itself and (thereby) of being,” and notes that Aquinas often
appeals to this principle. Swinburne (2004: 117) agrees and suggests, as I do, that this implies that “a
good God to whose power there is no limit will inevitably go on making more good things” (a conclu-
sion Aquinas does not endorse); however, Swinburne does not recognize the implications that this has
for his claim that there is no best world. Turner (2003: 146–48) uses a similar claim to motivate his
“multiverse” theodicy (discussed later in this section).
13 The astute reader will note that I have been moving back and forth between ‘people’ and ‘creatures.’ I
am deliberately vague about what kinds of living things are included in God’s continual creation and in
the afterlife. I am inclined to think that God will continue to create all kinds of conscious beings, and
agree with Dougherty (2014) that in the afterlife God will redeem non-human animals as well as humans.
My claims about God creating more people and giving everyone inﬁnitely valuable lives should be
understood to apply to whichever creatures are redeemed in the divine plan, whether this includes only
humans (and similarly intelligent extra-terrestrial species) or non-human animals as well.
14 Many Christian theodicists have endorsed universalism in the course of addressing the problem of evil
(e.g., Hick [2010: ch. 16], Adams [1999: 157], Collins [2013: 226–27]). The prospects of offering an
adequate explanation of evil may well be dim if we accept the traditional doctrine of an eternal hell
(Adams [1993], Buckareff and Plug [2013]).
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of the world is a function of the average value of people’s lives. If people’s lives all have
inﬁnite value, then the average value of lives in the world is inﬁnite. Or suppose that the
value of people’s lives contributes to the value of the world, but that there are other value
facts that also make a difference: e.g., the quality of relationships in the world, the justice
of social arrangements, etc. I am unable to think of any plausible candidates that are not, in
the eschaton, as good as we could wish them to be—presumably people’s relationships are
perfected, for example, and there is no unjust inequality. So it seems that for most plausible
determinants of the value of the world, the value of the world is inﬁnite.
One might still try to defend (2) even if the world is as just described, on the grounds
that inﬁnitely valuable worlds can still be improvable (Rowe [2004: 51]). Swinburne
(2004: 115) and Monton (2010: 124–27), for example, both think that God can add to an
inﬁnite number of people, and many multiverse theodicists tacitly assume this in their
discussions; such philosophers appear to hold that (4) is true even if the world is as
described above. Similarly, one might argue that (6) remains true, because even if in the
afterlife everyone eventually enjoys the beatiﬁc vision, God have lessened people’s suf-
fering in their earthly lives. The next three sections are devoted to showing that if the
world is as described above, God could not improve the world in these ways: not only is
the world inﬁnitely valuable, it is unsurpassable. In section III I argue against (4) and
(5); and in sections IV–V I argue against (6).
Before concluding this section, let me comment on the relationship between my posi-
tion and another response to the AFS that several philosophers have discussed in recent
years–so called “multiverse theodicies” (Kraay [2012]).15 Typically, these theodicies
claim that God has created every universe that is worthy of creation—e.g., every universe
that on-balance contains more good than evil. In so doing, they claim, God has created
the best possible world—for our world would be worse if any universe were removed
from it, and worse if any on-balance bad universe were added to it.
The most natural way for a continual creation to occur is for God to continue creating
universes. My position is thus naturally construed as a multiverse theory, and indeed,
some of my remarks in later sections attack arguments for (2) made by critics of multi-
verse theodicies (e.g., Monton 2010). However, my position differs from extant multi-
verse theodicists’ in that I do not think that God creates every creation-worthy universe.
It does not make sense to me to make universes, rather than persons, the primary loci of
value. While I am open to the claim that other parts of the world besides persons, like
relationships, play a part in determining its value, it does not seem plausible that the
value of the universes in the world contributes to the total value of the world above and
beyond the value of the things in those universes. So the divine policy “ﬁnd the good
universes, and create those,” does not seem to me as natural as “ﬁnd the possible people
whose lives are worth living, and create them,”16 or “ﬁnd the personal relationships
worth having, and bring about those,” or something more along those lines.
15 Representative examples include McHarry (1978), Forrest (1981), Turner (2003), and Hudson (2013).
For criticisms see Perkins (1980), Almeida (2008), and Monton (2010). Kraay (2012) contains further
discussion and references.
16 I think all lives are worth living, and so I am inclined to think that if it is possible for God to create all
possible people he does so (see section III for some reasons that this may not be possible). But if (con-
trary to fact, I would argue), there are some people such that, say, God cannot prevent them from being
eternally damned, I don’t think God creates those people (this would be the analogue of God only creat-
ing universes which are good on the whole).
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Admittedly, these policies might come to the same thing. But Almeida (2008: 149–
50); cf. Kraay (2012: 149–50) gives a plausible reason to think that they will not. Unless
some form of Leibnizian essentialism is true, there will be universes which are each indi-
vidually creation-worthy but which cannot jointly be created, because they contain some
of the same objects. For example, if our universe is creation-worthy, there is plausibly a
possible universe that is just like this universe except that in it, I eat oatmeal rather than
toast for breakfast this morning. Since I would exist in both of these universes were they
actual, but I can in fact exist in only one universe, God cannot create them both. Hence,
God cannot create all creation-worthy universes.
As far as I can see, no analogous problem affects the claim that God creates all possible
people (or all possible people with overall good lives). It does not seem as plausible that
one person’s existing makes it metaphysically impossible for another person to exist—
though see the discussion of Leibnizian essentialism in the next section. Of course, there are
many different ways in which all possible people can exist, and I am not claiming that any
way is as good as any other. But neither do I claim, as most multiverse theodicists appear
to, that there is some unique way that is best. Rather, I make the weaker claim that the way
in which God actually creates is unsurpassed—there is no better way that he could have cre-
ated instead, even if there are also other no worse ways that he could have created.
III. Improving the World by Adding Value-Bearers
On the simplest theories of how the value in a world determines the value of a world,
the latter is in some way a function of some “value-bearing parts” of the world—e.g.,
persons or moments in time. Following Vallentyne and Kagan (1997: 5), I will call these
value-bearing parts ‘locations.’ The most natural function is additive: the value of a
world is equal to the sum of the values at its locations. There are other possibilities,
though. Vallentyne and Kagan mention three: taking the average of the values at the
locations of a world, taking the minimum of those values, and measuring how equal the
distribution of value is across the locations. One could also combine these for a more
complicated aggregation function.
With this framework in hand, we can represent a world with n locations as follows:
W : fr1; r2; rng;
where the ri are real numbers. Assuming that value is additive, the value of W is equal
to the sum of the sequence r1, r2, . . . rn. (Countably) inﬁnite worlds work the same way,
except that the sequence is inﬁnitely long. So, for example, the value of
W1 : f1; 1=2; 1=4; . . .g
is 2.
Things get tricky when we encounter worlds like the following:
W2 : f1; 1; 1; . . .g:
Since the value of W2’s locations are not decreasing in a convergent series as in W1, W2
has inﬁnite value. It is an open debate in the literature on inﬁnite utility whether worlds
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like W2 can be improved upon.
17 If all we are concerned with is the sum of the values
of the locations in W2, then W2 cannot be improved upon (setting aside for the moment
the possibility of larger cardinalities of inﬁnity). Several philosophers, however, have
found it plausible that there are other general principles according to which other worlds
could be better than W2. Roughly speaking, these principles hold that we can improve
inﬁnitely valuable worlds in the same two ways we improve ﬁnitely valuable worlds: by
adding more locations with positive value, or by adding more value to the already exist-
ing locations.
With regards to the ﬁrst kind of improvement (adding locations), Monton (2010: 124)
suggests the following:
Adding Locations If (i) W* has all the locations that world W has and then some,
(ii) the values of the shared locations are the same, and (iii) the
values of the non-shared locations in W* sum to a positive
number, then W* is better than W.18
With regards to the second kind of improvement (adding value to existing locations),
Vallentyne and Kagan (1997: 11) suggest the following:
Improving Locations If (i) W* and W have exactly the same locations, and (ii) for
any ﬁnite set of locations there is a ﬁnite expansion such that
for all further expansions, W* is better than W, then W* is
better than W.19
In the next section I will consider Improving Locations, and whether it can be used to vindi-
cate (6) in an inﬁnite world. In the remainder of this section I will consider the possibility
that Adding Locations can be applied to show that the actual world can be improved by add-
ing either persons or species to it, thus vindicating (4) or (5). I will assume that value is
additive for the purposes of this section, because Adding Locations only makes sense if
value is additive. For example, if the value of a world is equal to the average or minimum
value of its locations, then adding a location to an inﬁnite world with a positive value less
than all the presently existing locations ought to make that world worse.
Suppose that persons are the value-bearing parts of the world, and the theological
framework I outlined in section II is correct. If persons are locations, there are numerous
ways in which the value at a location might be determined. We might look at a person’s
overall happiness, her overall moral virtue, or her ﬂourishing more broadly conceived.20
17 Vallentyne and Kagan (1997) is the best-known defense of the claim that inﬁnitely valuable worlds can
be improved. Articles arguing against this claim include Cain (1995) and Hamkins and Montero (2000).
18 I have silently altered Monton’s wording, and the label is mine. Compare Vallentyne and Kagan
(1997: 20n18).
19 As above, I have slightly altered wording and the label is mine. Vallentyne and Kagan formulate stronger prin-
ciples than this one, but the complications they introduce are not relevant to our discussion; and they are only
applicable if locations are “naturally ordered” like times, a possibility I discuss and dismiss in the next section.
Note also that while Monton’s principle assumes that value is additive, Vallentyne and Kagan’s does not.
20 The value “at” a personal location might differ from what is ordinarily meant by talk of the value of a
person. For example, how much value a personal location contributes to the world will plausibly depend
on how good of a life that person has. But a person might be valuable in the ordinary sense and have a
bad life.
INFINITE VALUE AND THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS 375
On any of these conceptions, my theological assumptions imply that each person’s life is
inﬁnitely good on the whole. We can then represent the actual world as follows:
@1 : f1;1;1; . . .g
@1 has two notable features. First, its total value is inﬁnite. Second, each location has
inﬁnite value. So both the total value of the world and the value of each of the locations
in the world are as high as they can be.
Nevertheless, Adding Locations suggests that W* could be better than @1 if it had
more people than @1, in a certain sense of ‘more.’ What would it mean for God to create
more people than he creates in the actual world? The cardinal numbers measure the num-
ber of elements in a set. Finite cardinal numbers are the familiar natural numbers, but
greater than all the ﬁnite cardinal numbers are the inﬁnite cardinal numbers, ℵ0 (pro-
nounced ‘aleph-null’), ℵ1, and so on. Any inﬁnite set which has countably many mem-
bers (i.e., it is possible to order those members, and then “count” them in that order) has
a cardinality of ℵ0. Consider, for example, the set of natural numbers:
N : f1; 2; 3; . . .g:
Now consider the set of even numbers:
E : f2; 4; 6; . . .g:
Two sets have the same cardinality if their members can be put in a 1-to-1 correspon-
dence with each other. The members of N and E are like that: one can get from N to E
just by doubling each member. Thus, N and E have the same cardinality, ℵ0.
For God to create a bigger cardinality of people, he would have to create uncountably
many people. Let’s set that possibility aside for the moment, and assume that God can
only create countably many people. No matter how many he creates, the cardinality of
people in the world remains the same. So in this sense, God cannot create more people
than he does.
There is, however, another sense in which we might say that N has more members
than E: N has all the members that E has and then some. This is the sense of ‘more’ that
Adding Locations appeals to in suggesting that God creates more locations in W* than
W. On this sense of ‘more,’ N has more members than E, but does not have more mem-
bers than
E0 : f0; 2; 4; 6; . . .g:
Let’s suppose that Adding Locations is right, and that adding more (valuable) locations
in this latter sense makes a world more valuable. And let’s further suppose that persons
are locations, as (4) would have it. I will now argue that even so, (4) is false, because
we cannot meaningfully say that there is some other creatable world W* that has all the
people in @ and then some.
The ﬁrst reason that we cannot do this is that it is not clear that there is now a deter-
minate fact about the relevant future properties of @—in particular, its future locations.
For example, the following seems plausible: if at time t there are multiple actions that
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God has most reason to perform, he will (given his perfect rationality) perform one of
them, but he is not determined to perform one of these actions rather than another. It is
likewise plausible that God is in this situation for some of his creative acts in @: that at
some time t God is free to create either person 9.2 or person 3.17, say. Condition (i) of
Adding Locations requires that for some world W* to be better than @, “W* has all the
locations that world @ has and then some.” However, if the above is correct, there may
be no determinate fact of the matter about which locations @ has. There can thus be no
other creatable world W* such that the set of people in @ is a proper subset of the set of
people in W*, because there is no well-deﬁned set of all the people in @.
The above way of putting this point suggests that God acts in time. Indeed, I have in
general spoken as if God is in time; I have said, for example, that after the physical
death of currently existing creatures, God will continue to create more. However, many
classical thinkers have held that God is outside of time. If this is so, then it may initially
seem that God could create everything in @ “all at once,” as it were, in which case it
does arguably make sense to say that there is some other world W* he could have cre-
ated instead with all the people in @ and then some.
I am inclined to accept the traditional doctrine of divine atemporality. Accordingly, I
plead guilty to speaking loosely about God’s actions. However, the above points still
stand even if God is outside of time. Defenders of divine timelessness nevertheless tend
to think that we can logically order God’s actions (Leftow [1991: 145]). An example of
a debate about the logical order of God’s actions is the intra-Calvinist dispute about
whether God’s decree to save some humans is logically posterior or logically prior to his
decree to permit humans to fall into sin (Plantinga [2004: 1])—where the latter option
would preclude God’s basing his decision to save some humans on the fact that he
allows some to fall into sin. What really matters for us here is whether God’s actions are
logically ordered, not whether they are temporally ordered. So long as God’s creation of
(say) universe A is logically prior to his creation of universe B, we can speak of him
“continuing to create” in the way I have done in this essay.21
On the speciﬁc point at issue here, it is not obvious, given that God’s actions are logi-
cally ordered, that there is a logical end to the inﬁnite series of creative acts we are con-
sidering, just as I earlier contended that there was no temporal end to God’s creative acts
if God is in time. More precisely: if we consider the logically ordered set of all God’s
actions, in which logically prior acts precede logically posterior acts, it may be that this
set has no last member. This implies that if we are able to attribute properties to the set
of all God’s actions, we must have some well-deﬁned limiting process by which we can
“construct” that set.22 But now my argument above applies: though God may necessarily
act in accordance with some general policy in adding to this set, this policy may not be
speciﬁc enough to determine his precise actions. Which of several particular acts he per-
forms at a (logical) time may sometimes be indeterminate, so that we cannot say that
21 It is possible that when we logically order all of God’s actions, we will ﬁnd that some actions consist in
creating multiple universes—e.g., universes A and B. When multiverse theodicists speak of God creating
multiple universes, most seem to have in mind his creating them in a single action in this way (we could
also speak of God performing multiple actions in a “divine instant,” and this would come to the same
thing). It is compatible with my view that God creates multiple universes “all at once” in this manner;
but we can still ask, even if God does this, whether he does anything logically after this.
22 Compare Jaynes’s (2003: 44) advice on inﬁnite sets.
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there is some other world W* with all of the people in @, because it is indeterminate
who all the people in @ are.23
This is the ﬁrst reason to doubt that we can meaningfully say that there is some other
creatable world W* that has all the people in @ and then some. But let us suppose that
there is no problematic indeterminacy in the properties of @. The claim that we can
meaningfully say that W* has all the people in @ and then some nevertheless incurs con-
troversial metaphysical commitments.
I presume that there are some facts about a person in a world in virtue of which that
person is the person she is. On one extreme, there is the Leibnizian view that all the
properties, including relational properties, of a being are essential to that being. On this
view all facts about a person make that person the person she is. On the other extreme, a
person is the person she is just in virtue of the non-qualitative (and presumably brute)
fact that she is (say) person 3.
The defender of (4) faces a balancing act. On the one hand, he must maintain that
nothing too close to Leibnizian essentialism is true. For if too many facts about a person
make that person the person she is, then it is impossible for two distinct worlds W and
W* to contain all the same persons. For example, person 3 in W may have the property
of being the third person created in the world, whereas the person in W* who is other-
wise qualitatively identical to person 3 may have the property of being the fourth person
created. In this case all we can say about W and W* is that they each contain ℵ0 people;
neither set of people is a subset of the other, and so neither has more people in either
sense of ‘more.’
On the other hand, the fewer the facts about a person that make that person the person
she is, the more limits there will be on how many possible people there are. For example,
suppose that the identity of a person is determined by the qualitative fact that her genetic
code is the way it is at the moment she is conceived. Since genetic codes are ﬁnite, there
are only countably many possible codes. Hence, there are only countably many possible
people that God can create. So, (by the deﬁnition of countability) it is possible for God
to put all possible people in an order. So, it is possible for God to (mentally) order them
and then create them in that order. Let’s suppose that God does this in @. In this case, it
is not possible for God to create one more person than he does in @. For in @ he actual-
izes all person-possibilities, and so creates all the people he can. Just as you cannot add
any more natural numbers to the set {1, 2, 3, . . .}, so you cannot add any more people
to @. They’re all there already.
So, for Adding Locations to be applicable to @, it needs to be the case that few
enough facts determine identity that the same people can exist in both @ and W*. How-
ever, the facts that do determine identity need to be such that there are an uncountable
number of possible people for God to create.
If there are uncountably many possible people, then the defender of improving the
world by adding people may not need to appeal to Adding Locations at all. One might
think that an omnipotent being like God can just create a world Wℵ with a higher cardi-
nality of people than @ (Monton [2010: 124–27])—ℵ1, say. In this case it does not mat-
ter whether the set of people in @ is a subset of the people in Wℵ, so that neither my
ﬁrst objection to the applicability of Adding Locations nor Leibnizian essentialism
23 Depending on how we think of divine freedom in this case and the nature of God’s choices, this scenario
may imply that God is not able to know his own future free actions (Swinburne [1994: 134]).
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threaten this scenario. Since ℵ1 > ℵ0, a world with ℵ1 valuable locations in it is more
valuable than a world with ℵ0 valuable locations in it.
If, however, there are uncountably possible people, and it is possible for God to per-
form uncountably many actions, then it is again not clear that in @ God does not simply
create all the possible people there are. For suppose that there is some set of all possible
people. Then, if there are no barriers to God’s performing any uncountable number of
creative acts “in an instant,” he should be able to create all the people in that set (for
example, a God who can perform uncountably many acts could presumably create an
inﬁnite number of objects each with a size of r units for each positive real r; so why
could he not create a person corresponding to each r?). And if God does create all possi-
ble people in @, then it is not possible for him to create more, in either sense of ‘more.’
So the defender of improvability by addition must say that there is no set of all possi-
ble people. In particular, he must say that, for every cardinality ℵn, there are more than
ℵn possible people. In this case, I think it is at best unclear whether God can create a
world such that it is not possible for him to have created another world with more peo-
ple. For example, perhaps God can perform so many creative actions in a particular
divine instant that there is no set of all the actions God performs in that instant. Perhaps,
for example, at some instant (or at each instant) he creates more than ℵn universes for
any cardinal number ℵn. If we consider all of God’s actions in this scenario, does he cre-
ate fewer people than he could have otherwise? It is at least not obvious that the answer
to this question is yes. This question involves quantifying over a number of creative
actions too large to be measured by any cardinal number, and it is difﬁcult to even
understand, much less answer, a question like that.
Similar problems to the above befall (5), the claim that God can improve the world by
creating more species—the thought being that the world is improved by having greater vari-
ety in it. One way to formalize this is to take species to be locations, and take some facts
about species (e.g., the ﬂourishing of particular members of that species) to determine the
value of each location. Then we can sum the locations and, in accordance with the principle
of plenitude, the more species there are, the greater the overall value of the world will be—
at least for all ﬁnite worlds. When we get to inﬁnite worlds, then if we accept Adding Loca-
tions, adding more species will continue to make the world better.
This faces all the problems (4) faces. If God is able to create uncountably many spe-
cies, then it is not clear why he cannot create all possible species. Conversely, if God
can only create countably many species, it still needs to be the case that there are more
than countably many possible species, so that God cannot create all possible species—
and this is not obviously the case. Indeed, it is more plausible that there are only count-
ably many possible species than that there are only countably many possible people—be-
cause it is more plausible that species are individuated by something like a genetic code
than that persons are. Finally, if there is no determinate fact about which future species
God will create, then Adding Locations cannot apply at any rate.
My discussion of the plausibility of (4) and (5) in an inﬁnite world has focused on their
elaboration in the formal framework I sketched at the beginning of this section, via the
principle Adding Locations. It may be that my formalizations of these propositions do not
entirely capture the spirit behind the original positions; in particular, my formalization of
(5) as taking species to be locations in the technical sense and the value of the world to be
the sum of the value at those locations may not be the best way to elaborate the principle
of plenitude in a formal theory of value. But these formalizations have served only to focus
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discussion, and my arguments do not turn on the particular formalizations I have employed.
My arguments apply to any position which says that God could have made a better world
than this one by creating more people or species, whatever broader theory of value these
claims are incorporated into. In addition, although persons and species are the only loca-
tions I have considered here, for most other plausible locations, Adding Locations will have
many or all of the same problems considered above. For example, if we take locations to
be personal relationships, then assuming that in the afterlife God will bring every person
into a relationship with every other person, God can only create more relationships by cre-
ating more persons, leading to all the difﬁculties discussed above.
To sum up this section: One might think that God can create a better world than @
by creating a world with more locations than @. For this to be the case, God needs to
create a world W* which either has uncountably many locations or has all the locations
that @ does, and then some. The ﬁrst may not be metaphysically possible, but if it is it
is of no help to the defender of (2). For if God can create uncountably many locations,
he can presumably create all the members of the set of all possible locations. If there is
no such set, because there are too many possible locations, it is as best unclear whether
it is necessary that in @, God does not create as many locations as he could have.
For God to add to the world in the second way above, by adding locations to @, @
must have determinate locations. But if some of God’s creations are free, it is not obvi-
ous that @ has determinate locations. Moreover, @ and other worlds God could have
created instead need to be such that the same locations can exist in both—contra Leib-
nizian essentialism. At the same time, there need to be enough possible locations that
God cannot simply create them all in @.
It appears, then, that the most plausible way to defend the claim that God can improve
the world by addition is to say that (a) locational (e.g., personal) identity conditions are
such that God could have created the same locations in some world W* as in @, (b) there
are uncountably many possible locations for God to create (so that God can create some
extra people in W*), but (c) God cannot perform an uncountably inﬁnite number of tasks
(otherwise he could just create all the uncountable locations), and (d) there is a determinate
fact about all of God’s (logically) future actions. Jointly, these are high metaphysical costs.
IV. Improving the World by Improving its Parts
In the last section I argued that (4) and (5) are false, even if Adding Locations is true. My argu-
ment there was made easier by the fact that the ways in which the critic thinks God could have
improved the world are not ones that we have good reason to believe do not obtain. (For
example, we cannot know that God does not create all possible people, nor do we have any
good evidence that he does not.) Arguing against (6), however, is more difﬁcult, because we
can all see that there is suffering in the world that could have been avoided. Nevertheless, in
this and the next section I will argue that (6) is also plausibly false. In this section I will con-
sider a defense of (6) via the principle Improving Locations, and in the next I will consider
whether (6) can be defended without appeal to a principle like this.
Here is the principle again for reference:
Improving Locations If (i) W* and W have exactly the same locations, and (ii) for
any ﬁnite set of locations there is a ﬁnite expansion such that
for all further expansions, W* is better than W, then W* is
better than W.
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Let us assume—contra critics like Hamkins and Montero (2000: 238–40)—that Improv-
ing Locations is correct. I will now argue that even so, neither it nor plausible revisions
of it show our world to be worse than it could have been.
One of the objections to applying Adding Locations I made in the previous section
applies to any attempted application of Improving Locations (and the revisions of the
principle I will go on to consider): it assumes that the locations of @ are deﬁnite, so that
it is possible to identify some other world W* such that W* and @ have all the same
locations, but some locations are improved in W*. And as we have seen, assuming that
God is free in his continual creation of locations, this is plausibly not the case. But for
the rest of this section I will waive this concern, and assume that the possible locations
that I will consider are deﬁnite in the actual world.
If the locations of a world are persons or something else that given my theological
assumptions have inﬁnite value over all of time, then the actual world is still repre-
sentable as:
@1 : f1;1;1; . . .g:
The value of the actual world then remains inﬁnite if we adopt any of the aggregative
principles mentioned by Vallentyne and Kagan. The average and minimum of the values
at its locations are both inﬁnite, and the distribution of value is completely equal. It
should also be clear that Improving Locations does not apply to @1 if any of Vallentyne
and Kagan’s proposed aggregation methods are correct. On any of the above non-additive
methods of measuring @1’s value, @1 is maximally valuable even on any ﬁnite set of
locations, so (ii) cannot be satisﬁed. And if value is additive, the fact that each location
of @1 has inﬁnite value means that Improving Locations does not apply to it. The loca-
tions of @1 cannot be improved.
The proponent of (6), then, must contend that the locations of a world are not persons,
but instead something improvable.24 One of the simplest improvable locations is times.
Suppose that the value of a time is determined by the net balance of happiness at that
time. Since the net balance of happiness at many times is not maximal, then individual
locations can be improved—for example by lessening creaturely suffering in the way (6)
suggests.
Nevertheless, this still does not let us apply Improving Locations to the actual world.
The second clause of Improving Locations requires that for ﬁnite subsets of the set of all
locations, there is a ﬁnite expansion of that subset such that for all further expansions,
W* is better than W. Assuming additivity, this means that
W3 : 2; 1; 1; . . .
is better than
W4 : 1; 1; 1; . . .;
because, e.g., if the ﬁrst expansion is our starting location, the total value at any further
expansion is 1 greater for W3 than for W4. But we have been supposing that for any
24 In most of what follows I again assume for ease of discussion that value is additive. I think I could
reframe all my points in terms of the other aggregation strategies considered above, however.
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person, there is some time at which that person becomes perfect and enjoys full commu-
nion with God. However we are determining value at a time (pleasure, ﬂourishing, self-
actualization, quality of relationships, etc.), it seems that the temporal locations after
which this occurs will have inﬁnite value, so that the world will look something like this,
@2 : f1; 0;1; . . .;1;1;1; . . .g;
where the inﬁnities begin whenever the ﬁrst person enters the beatiﬁc vision. But as far
as Improving Locations is concerned, @2 is not bettered by
W5 : 2; 0;1; . . .;1;1;1; . . .;
because for any starting subset of @2/W5’s locations, there is an expansion such that the
value in both worlds is inﬁnite—e.g., the expansion that ﬁrst includes one of the loca-
tions with inﬁnite value. Since ∞ ≯ ∞, Improving Locations does not imply that W5 is
better than @2.
Perkins (1983: 242–43) seems to suggest taking individual events as locations. This
would give us a world more like
@3 :f1; 0; 2; . . .;
 3; 1;1; . . .;
4;1;1; . . .;
. . .g;
where the different lines represent events at different times, and the inﬁnities represent
the event of someone enjoying the beatiﬁc vision at that time. We could also take crea-
turely experiences to be locations, giving us a world like
@4 :f1; 0;1; . . .;1;1;1; . . .;
 4; 2; 5; . . .;1;1;1; . . .;
2; 3;5;1; . . .;1;1;1; . . .;
. . .g;
where the different lines represent different people’s lives. But @3 and @4 still contain
(inﬁnitely many!) locations with inﬁnite value, and so Improving Locations still does not
apply. Similar remarks apply for other candidate locations, like individual experiences in
people’s lives.
The defender of (6) has at least two options available to her at this point. She could
deny that inﬁnite value at a time is metaphysically possible, and insist that instead the
most that God could do is to ensure that people become progressively closer and closer
to God, so that the value in a person’s life increases without bound as time goes on. This
would allow her to keep the value at any given time ﬁnite, so that Improving Locations
can apply, while retaining the spirit of my universalist assumption (which would still
imply that the total value in the world—and in a person’s life—is inﬁnite). Call this posi-
tion quasi-universalism.
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The defender of (6) could also revise (ii) of Improving Locations to say that for all
further expansions with ﬁnite value, W* is better than W. Let’s call this revision Improv-
ing Locations*. So, the proponent of (6) can either embrace quasi-universalism, or
embrace Improving Locations*.
Nevertheless, on either of these maneuvers the locations of the world need to be some-
thing that sometimes (on Improving Locations*) or always (on quasi-universalism) has
ﬁnite value. This means that persons still cannot be locations. But the most obvious can-
didates for improvable locations, times, are intuitively ill suited to play that role. Con-
sider again
W2 : 1; 1; 1; . . .;
but now taking the locations to be times, and consider also
W6 : 2; 2; 2; . . .:
Suppose that God creates W2 by creating one person each day, each of whom lives only
for that day and enjoys 1 unit of utility. He creates W6 by creating the exact same people
as in W2, but creating the second and third person a day earlier than in W2, the fourth
and ﬁfth person two days earlier than in W2, the sixth and seventh person three days ear-
lier, and so on (suppose that none of these people interact with each other, so that there
is no other discernible difference between W2 and W6). Just as Hilbert can achieve dou-
ble occupancy in the rooms of his Hotel without adding any guests, so God can achieve
double value in the days of his world without making anyone better off. I take it to be
clear that under this description, W6 is not better than W2.
25 A world is not made better
merely in virtue of its citizens being created faster.
What other possible locations are improvable? One natural proposal, in line with (6),
is creaturely experiences. Recall that (6) says that the quality of creaturely experiences
could have been better than it in fact is: for example, my neighbor’s dog’s toothache
might have been slightly milder. Here we face a problem with individuating experiences.
If the dog’s toothache in one world is a different experience than her toothache in a dif-
ferent world, then the two worlds do not share the same experiences and so, if locations
are experiences, Improving Locations(*) is silent. And since the total value of the experi-
ences in both worlds is inﬁnite, the world with the less painful toothache is not better on
ﬁnitely aggregative grounds either (analogous remarks go for Perkins’s suggested loca-
tions, events).
One way to avoid incomparability is to take experiences to be individuated by the
times that they occur in creaturely lives. But I think there are counterexamples like that
25 This case is similar to Bostrom’s (2011: 2.2) counterexample to one of Vallentyne and Kagan’s stronger
principles; cf. Mulgan (2002: 165–67). Cain (1995) also argues that points in space or time cannot be the
value-bearing parts of a world. In Cain’s ﬁrst example, you are in an inﬁnite universe with inﬁnitely
many persons. You are forced to choose between creating a continually expanding sphere inside of which
everyone is happy, and outside of which everyone is unhappy, or a continually expanding sphere inside
of which everyone is unhappy, and outside of which everyone is happy. At any moment of time there is
inﬁnite utility in the second scenario, and inﬁnite disutility in the ﬁrst; however, any person in the world
enjoys (over all of time) inﬁnite utility in the ﬁrst scenario, and inﬁnite disutility in the second. Cain
argues that you should bring about the ﬁrst scenario, and that this suggests that persons, and not moments
in time, are the proper loci of value in the world.
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above to times in a life being locations as well. Suppose that there is only one conscious
being, and that we are comparing his experiences in two worlds. We are left with the
result that
W7 : f1; 2; 3; . . .g
is better than
W8 : f0; 1; 2; . . .g;
even though W8 might differ from W7 only in that our conscious being took a nap before
doing whatever it is that gives him ever-increasing utility in W7. This seems to me a
wrong result.
It is also pretheoretically plausible that the bearers of value in the world are the kinds
of things we take to have intrinsic moral worth—e.g., persons—rather than things like
times or moments in a person’s life. Times or creaturely experiences could be moved
around, and this would plausibly change the value of a world—for example, a (ﬁnite) life
that goes from bad to good seems better than one that goes from good to bad, even if
the total amount of happiness in each life is equivalent. This suggests that something like
a person’s life is a more proper bearer of value.
Other things in the world besides persons, however, may have the kind of requisite
moral signiﬁcance to be locations. For example, one might think that relationships, or
just social arrangements, are locations. Defenses of (2) on the basis of such candidate
locations face a dilemma: either the proposed locations will not be improvable, or their
transworld identity conditions will be too weak to avoid incomparability.26 Take personal
relationships. If we hold the relationship between A and B to be constituted by all inter-
actions between A and B, including those in the eschaton, then, given universalism, it is
plausible that all relationships will be inﬁnitely good on the whole. If, by contrast, we
limit personal relationships to shorter periods of time so as to include imperfect Earthly
relationships, we face a problem of not only giving non-arbitrary identity conditions, but
of also ensuring that those conditions are such that my (Earthly) relationship with my
wife in @ and my relationship with my wife in W* are the same relationship, but with
different properties, rather than different relationships (making @ and W* incomparable
as far as Improving Locations(*) is concerned). Steering between the horns of this
dilemma would be a difﬁcult task.
My objections to (6) so far have supposed that either Improving Locations or Improv-
ing Locations* is the strongest principle of its type that applies in worlds with inﬁnite
value. Vallentyne and Kagan indicate in a footnote (20n18) that they think that Improv-
ing Locations “would remain plausible . . . if it were revised to apply to worlds where
all, except perhaps for a ﬁnite number, of inﬁnitely many locations are the same.” As it
stands this is a promissory note; they do not tell us how to revise Improving Locations in
this way. (If (i) is revised to say that W* and W differ only on ﬁnitely many locations,
then (ii) must also be changed so as to allow some kind of “mapping” between the loca-
tions of W and W*.) However, I think that many people will share Vallentyne and
Kagan’s intuition here, and those who do may ﬁnd my earlier objections unsatisfactory.
A critic of my argument may admit that a world lacking some evil present in ours would
26 This dilemma also applies if one is a “pluralist” about locations, and thinks that there are multiple loci of
value.
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have different locations (e.g., experiences) in parts of the world connected to that evil,
but think that provided that the worlds are otherwise the same, the world lacking the evil
is better.
Even so, it is plausible that these worlds will not be the same apart from that evil, but
will differ in inﬁnitely many locations. In an inﬁnite world the possible effects of chang-
ing a particular event are greatly increased. An inﬁnite world increases both the number
of ways in which a seemingly isolated event can have ramiﬁcations elsewhere in the
world, and the amount of time free creatures have to respond to evils in the ways
appealed to by various theodicies.27
For example, suppose that God is working to bring me into communion with himself
in the afterlife. What strategies God will engage in will depend on, among other things,
what kinds of evils I have experienced or perpetrated. Plausibly, these evils will affect
my moral psychology and so responsiveness to different types of moral and spiritual edu-
cation. In addition, the evils I have experienced or perpetrated may each require particu-
lar attention—in order to be purged, atoned for, or made right—before God can become
reconciled with me. These responses to the evils in question will have further repercus-
sions for the overall shape of my life, through their inﬂuence on my memory, self-
conception, and subsequent moral and spiritual development. My overall life may thus
differ depending on whether or not I experience or perpetrate a particular evil. Whatever
locations end up being, it is then plausible that an inﬁnite number of locations will differ
between the worlds in which this evil does and does not occur.
Similar remarks go for our relationships with other persons. Suppose that in the after-
life all ﬁnite persons eventually become reconciled with each other.28 The process by
which this takes place will presumably depend on the actions of the persons involved.
The evils that I have committed or suffered in my earthly relationship with my father will
necessitate different strategies by which we or God perfect our heavenly relationship. For
similar reasons to those given above, the worlds with and without some particular evil in
our relationship may thus differ in inﬁnitely many locations.
One might worry that at least some evils will only have negative future effects, so that
the above lives or relationships, and so world on a whole, will be worse off for the pres-
ence of those evils. This judgment would require a different ranking principle than the
hypothetical principle currently under consideration, which requires that only a ﬁnite
number of locations between the two worlds differ. But let us suppose that there is
another ranking principle that vindicates the intuition that an evil that has inﬁnitely many
negative future effects, and no positive effects, makes the world worse off.
Even so, it is debatable whether there are evils which will have solely negative effects,
as this objection supposes. Consider two recent theodicies, those of Marilyn Adams (1999)
and Robin Collins (2013). Adams (1999) holds that the character of the good relationship a
person enjoys with God in heaven depends on (among other things, presumably) the evils
that person has suffered. She argues that Christ identiﬁes with horror participants through
his death on the cross, and that participation in horrors thus allows for a special kind of
27 Whether this response will work for animal suffering depends on whether animals continue to exist in an
afterlife as well (see note 13). Perhaps the defender of (6) could press animal suffering against those who
deny this, but I would simply take this as an argument for including animals in God’s ultimate redemp-
tive plan.
28 This makes more sense if there are only countably many, and not uncountably many, people.
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intimacy with God. People who have not experienced horrors are also able to enjoy inti-
macy with God, but the character of their relationship is different. Although Adams does
not explicitly say this, it appears that on her view the relationships which different people
ultimately enjoy with God are all or mostly incomparable—the horror-participant and the
non-horror-participant each enjoy a special relationship with God organically connected
to their own life histories, but since the latter is not better than the former the horror-
participant would not wish away the horrors he has participated in (167).
Adams’s theodicy thus challenges the claim that some evils will have uniformly negative
effects for our relationship with God. Collins’s theodicy, on the other hand, challenges the
claim that some evils will have uniformly negative effects for our relationship with other
human beings. The central idea of Collins’s (2013: 222) “connection-building theodicy” is
that certain virtuous responses to evil—such as forgiveness and sacriﬁcial aid—contribute
to “ongoing, intrinsically valuable connections . . . between personal agents.” Collins con-
tends that the ongoing character of these connections makes plausible that they “will even-
tually outweigh the disvalue of the evils that God must allow in order for them to exist”
(222). For my purposes in this paper, however, it is sufﬁcient that these connections con-
tribute positively to our relationships with others in such a way that the world containing a
particular evil is not overall worse than the world lacking that evil.
As the above caveat hopefully makes clear, my response to the argument that the world
would be better off if not for the presence of evils with uniformly negative effects has not
been to defend a “greater-good” theodicy. My point is not that had God prevented some
evil, this would have made things worse overall by preventing some greater good or caus-
ing some greater evil. Rather, I think that God’s preventing any evil plausibly has further
effects, good and bad and neutral, throughout the world, rendering the world in which the
evil was prevented incomparable with the world in which the evil was not prevented, on
any principle like Improving Locations that we could formulate. The above discussion sug-
gests some ways in which this can occur, but it is not meant to be exhaustive.
In this section I have argued that given the theological assumptions with which I
started, Improving Locations does not apply to our world, because it has locations with
inﬁnite value no matter what we take locations to be. The proponent of (6) could
respond by embracing a stronger principle like Improving Locations* or denying that
universalism is true if God exists and insisting that instead quasi-universalism is. But the
proponent of (6) is still not in a position to show that the world can be improved. For
(6) requires that some of the locations of the world be improvable. But examples make
clear that eligible locations, like times, are not the loci of value in the world. I have
argued that more plausible locations, like persons, have inﬁnite value at them, and so
cannot be improved.
Even if, contrary to this, we can identify improvable locations, in an inﬁnite world it
is plausible that changing one part of the world will lead to inﬁnitely many other parts of
the world being changed as well in a way that makes comparison impossible. For exam-
ple, preventing an evil a person has participated in may lead to God acting differently to
fulﬁll his goal of redeeming that person or to the character of that person’s ultimate rela-
tionship with God and others being different. The world in which the evil is prevented
and that in which it is not will then plausibly be incomparable even on some hypothetical
principle stronger than Improving Locations or Improving Locations*. Finally, this is all
assuming that there is a determinate fact about God’s future actions and thus the loca-
tions of the world, a disputable assumption itself.
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V. The Particularist Challenge
In the last two sections I have considered ways in which the proponent of the AFS might
defend the claim that God could have made a better world than this one even on the hypoth-
esis that the world is inﬁnite, by appeal to general principles like Adding Locations and
Improving Locations. I noted in section III that my objections to (4) and (5) did not rely on
their speciﬁc formulations within the formal framework I sketched there. However, this is
not so obviously true for (6). I suspect that many people will maintain that
(6) God could have made a better world than this one by lessening the suffering
of creatures,
but deny that (6) can or needs to be formulated in terms of an inﬁnitely aggregative value
theory like Vallentyne and Kagan’s. Readers ﬁtting this description may view my appeals
to various facts about inﬁnity in criticizing (6) as mere metaphysical parlor tricks. Such
readers may simply think it obvious, in light of the horrendous evils in the world, that
(2) If God exists, he could have created a better world than this one,
even given that this world’s citizens and their relationships are perfected or continually
improved in an afterlife.29
I think that my discussion in the last part of section IV casts doubt on the correctness of this
intuition even if one does not think it needs to be cast in terms of some particular formal value
theory. It is plausible, whatever one thinks about Improving Locations and similar principles,
that inﬁnitely valuable worlds that differ in inﬁnitely many ways or in which the inﬁnitely
valuable experiences that people enjoy are of a different character are not comparable. Never-
theless, I will also try to respond to this “particularist challenge”more directly.
I do not want to commit myself to the correctness of aggregative value theory, or to
any particular formal system for measuring value, or even to the claim that the goodness
of worlds can be measured, rather than just partially ordered. For my part, I suspect that
value cannot be atomized, and that how a particular part contributes to the good of the
whole depends on what the rest of the whole is, just as how a particular part of a sym-
phony contributes to its quality as a whole depends on what the rest of the symphony is.
But most arguments for (2), and for (6) more speciﬁcally, at least tacitly presuppose
some kind of aggregative value theory, usually an additive one. For example, Perkins’s
(1983) argument for (6) relies on constructing a world W* exactly like @ except that it
contains one event which involves less pain. The only way that this can guarantee that
W* will be better than @ is if pain is disvaluable and the value of the world as a whole
is increased by any local increase in value. So the main reason that I have framed my
arguments in terms of aggregative value theory is because such theories tend to be pre-
supposed by arguments that God could have made a better world than our own.
That said, it is certainly open to a defender of (6) to reject additive or aggregative the-
ories of value. If she does, she can take one of two positions. The ﬁrst position is that
although value is not aggregative, there are still general principles for determining how
29 As Hudson (2013: 241) puts it, “When we focus upon some known and horrid feature of our history, . . .
it just seems obvious to many that . . . the presence of that horriﬁc evil disqualiﬁes our world from being
best”—or, we can add, unsurpassable.
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good a world is (these principles may only allow us to partially order worlds in terms of
goodness, and not to assign numerical values or ranges to their goodness). The second
position is a more radical particularism that says that the only way to judge the goodness
of worlds is to look at individual cases.
If the world is inﬁnitely extended into the future, then the second position makes (2)
inscrutable. It is impossible for us to know or comprehend all the axiologically relevant facts
about an inﬁnite world. We cannot see how the world-part with which we are acquainted ﬁts
into the whole well enough to judge whether or not our world could be improved. So if (2) is
to be defended, there must be some principle which we can appeal to that says that no matter
what the future may bring, the world would be better if it were this other way instead.30
However, if the defender of the AFS wishes to argue for (2) on its basis, she must tell
us some story about what those general principles are, and we must be persuaded that they
do not fall prey to analogues of worries I canvassed above for arguments based on
aggregative value theory. I am skeptical that this project can succeed. For what we ﬁnd in
general when introducing inﬁnity into a domain is that arguments and principles that
straightforwardly apply in ﬁnite cases lead to contradictions or paradoxes when applied in
inﬁnite cases—for example, the conclusions that “if a chord in a circle is drawn at ran-
dom, . . . the probability that it will be less than the side of the inscribed equilateral trian-
gle” is ½, ⅔, and ¾ (Bertrand’s paradox, as summarized by Keynes [1921: IV.7]), that
one cannot move from point 1 to point 0 because to do so one must ﬁrst go through points
½, ¼, etc. (Zeno’s dichotomy paradox), and that it is possible to decompose a solid ball
and reassemble it into two balls each the same size as the original (the Banach-Tarski
paradox). I am not at all conﬁdent that in the kinds of scenarios we’ve been considering,
inﬁnite worlds, inﬁnite actions, or inﬁnite value all work in precisely the way I’ve sug-
gested. But I do hope to have shown that we should be extremely cautious in concluding
that arguments about improvability that apply in ﬁnite worlds go through in inﬁnite
worlds.31
30 Dustin Crummett has suggested to me that there may be a middle ground between these two positions:
roughly, a view which denied that there are general principles that allow us to even partially order the
goodness of the worlds, but which nevertheless held that there are defeasible, pro tanto rules for judging
whether a certain feature of the world makes it better or worse. For example, this view might say that an
experience being painful tends to make the world in which it takes place worse, absent some special rea-
son to think it doesn’t in this case. I suspect, however, that this view will ultimately falter on one of the
horns of my dilemma. The more easily overridden these pro tanto rules are, the less plausible it will be
that they can tell us that various features of the world in fact make the world worse off than it could have
been, given that we are only acquainted with a ﬁnite part of an inﬁnite world. The less easily overridden
they are, the more they will look like general rules of the kind I suggest we should be wary of when
moving from ﬁnite to inﬁnite domains.
31 I suspect that the best way for the defender of (2) to meet this challenge is to deny that talk of inﬁnite
value makes sense at all, and to adopt a radically different approach to axiology, such as Thomson’s
(2008) “exemplar” model, on which there is a paradigm case of a good K against which all other Ks are
measured. This is one way of reading Fales (2013: 357–62). Fales claims that there is a best possible
world, one that contains “nothing but the best.” This is a world populated solely by God and creatures
that are duplicates of God except that they are caused to exist—they are not a se. Space precludes me
from giving this position the attention it deserves. Sufﬁce to say that I think that even if it can be elabo-
rated in a way that avoids the problems with inﬁnity I have raised in this paper, Fales’s position is incon-
sistent with value judgments many theists will be inclined to make. For example, the principle of
plenitude discussed earlier sees God’s goodness better expressed in a diversity of creatures than in one
kind alone. And Hick (2010: 255–56) suggests that it is better, other things equal, for us to start out
imperfect and gradually become more perfect than to be created perfect to begin with, especially if the
former happens as a result of our own free choices.
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In sum: Proponents of the AFS may wish to argue for (2) “directly,” without recourse
to principles like Adding Locations or Improving Locations. But the reason these princi-
ples were introduced by value theorists in the ﬁrst place is because evaluative judgments
that straightforwardly apply to ﬁnite worlds may only apply to inﬁnite worlds under cer-
tain conditions. The proponent of the AFS who thus wishes to argue for (2) without
appeal to such principles faces the difﬁcult task of showing that her evaluative judgments
apply in inﬁnite worlds, despite inﬁnity’s notoriously counterintuitive nature. Indeed, if
she wishes to eschew moral principles altogether, then it seems that she cannot rationally
afﬁrm (2). For if we need to be in possession of all the relevant facts about an object to
make a moral judgment about it, then we cannot judge that there is a better world than
this one because we can never be in possession of all the relevant facts about this world.
VI. Problems of Evil
In this paper I have argued against the Argument from Surpassability by denying the pre-
mise that God could have created a better world than this one. I have argued that God
cannot improve the world by adding value-bearers to it, nor can he improve it by reduc-
ing suffering—either because these actions are not possible or because they would not
improve the world, but merely replace it with another incomparable inﬁnitely valuable
world.
I do not think that my argument defeats the problem of evil broadly conceived. The
story I have sketched here leaves mysterious why God brings about or allows the evils
we ﬁnd in the world. For instance, I have not claimed that God uses evil as a means to
obtain an inﬁnitely valuable world, or that he could not have created such a world with-
out evil. As such, some arguments from evil are untouched by the arguments in this
paper. For example, my criticism of the AFS does nothing to answer Fales’s (2013: 353–
55) contention that a morally perfect God would not allow someone to undergo terrible
evils without her consent, even if those evils ultimately contribute to the good of the
world or even her own life.
That said, I suspect that the problems that I have identiﬁed for the AFS in an inﬁnite
world will affect other “consequentialist” arguments from evil. I am thinking in particular
of the Argument from Gratuitous Evils, as formulated by William Rowe (1996: 2):
(7) There exist instances of intense suffering which [God] could have prevented
without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally
bad or worse.
(8) [God] would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering [God] could, unless
[God] could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting
some evil equally bad or worse.
It follows from (7) and (8) that
(3) God does not exist.
(8) is very similar to (1)—i.e., the claim that God would create the best world he can. As
stated (8) is not terribly precise, and I suspect that attempts to formalize it in terms of an
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aggregative theory of value would make (8) a special case of (1). (7) would then be very
similar to (6)—the claim that God could have made the world as a whole better by mak-
ing some experiences of creatures better. But I have argued that there are serious difﬁcul-
ties with (6); and (7) would inherit all these difﬁculties.
This discussion is merely suggestive; responding to the Argument from Gratuitous
Evils fully is beyond the scope of this paper. But I would like to close with a suggestion
of how my arguments might reorient discussion of the problem of evil. I suspect that just
as Bostrom (2011) argues that the problem of inﬁnite utility makes consequentialism an
untenable moral theory, the kinds of considerations I have raised in this paper show that
God is not a consequentialist—that God’s reasons for action are not (only) consequential-
ist reasons, for the consequentialist goal of maximizing value massively underdetermines
what a perfect God would do. In discussing atheistic arguments from evil, both propo-
nents and critics would thus do well to consider the kinds of non-consequentialist motiva-
tions a perfect being might have.
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